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Editorial Note:
The working paper summarises the results of a study conducted at the MZES within the project
“Interest Intermediation in the European Union”. The findings are summed up as a report for the trade
associations and companies participating in the survey.
Prof. Dr. Beate Kohler-Koch holds a chair in Political Science at the University of Mannheim, „Jean
Monnet Chair for European Integration“ (honorary title). Her main fields of research are International
Relations and European Integration. Apart from her own research (interest intermediation in Europe,
challenges to democratic governance through Europeanisation and globalisation) she is the co-
ordinator of a national research programme on governance in the EU under the auspices of the DFG
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). She is head of the Department of Comparative and European
Integration Studies at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Currently she participates
in an independent expert group preparing the next European summit.
Christine Quittkat studied Political Sciences, History and Public Law in Heidelberg/Germany and
Manchester/Great Britain. Since 1997 she is working in the project „Interest Intermediation in the
European Union“ at the MZES and prepares her PhD thesis in Political Science at the University of
Mannheim on  “The Europeanisation of Interest Intermediation: French Trade Association in
Comparative Perspective.“
Abstract
The working paper gives a first evaluation of a comprehensive survey of trade associations in
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and at the European level. This survey is part of a broader
research programme on “Interest Intermediation in the European Union” that started with a number of
case studies and a survey of the Members of the European Parliament on their experience and their
attitudes concerning lobbying. The objective of the research is twofold: to give an empirical account of
the differences and similarities between organisational patterns and strategies of national and
European trade associations, and to explain the existing convergences or continuing discrepancies in
theoretical terms.
The questions were selected in a way to test the relevance of selected variables in terms of specific
characteristics of actors and institutional properties of member states and the EU system. The data of
the survey confirm our expectation that trade associations have adjusted to the (new) “European”
political dimension but they also reveal significant differences in organisation and strategic behaviour
along national lines.
This is in contradiction to conventional wisdom which tells us that the Community system’s specific
properties will lead to specific patterns of interest representation in EU politics, and that the increasing
orientation towards a common environment will promote the convergence of national systems.
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What we did
Between June 1998 and March 1999 we have asked all German, British, and French trade
associations, as well as transnational European trade associations about their relationship with
European and national political institutions and other organisations. Our high return rate demonstrates
that the subject is considered to be a relevant one: the final count of questionnaires returned was
860.1
The issue: The “Europeanisation” of interest representation
Due to the changes in the distribution of competencies between European and national political
institutions we expected economic interest groups to attribute a higher importance to the European
political institutions and, in consequence, to have rearranged and intensified their interest
representation and organisation at the European level in response to the increase in regulation powers
of the EU.
The increasing importance of EU institutions and the dual path of interest
intermediation
Regarding the changed competencies of the EU since the 1980s the assessment of the increasing
importance of the European institutions is quite unequivocal and most respondents agree that the
European institutions have gained importance for the representation of their interests. Yet, this has
not, so the general picture, reduced the status of the national political institutions for interest
representation of business.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
%
Eu
ro
pe
an
C
om
m
is
si
on
EU
 re
g.
 &
st
an
d.
au
th
or
iti
es
C
ou
nc
il
EP
na
tio
na
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
na
tio
na
l r
eg
.
& 
st
an
d.
Au
th
or
iti
es
na
tio
na
l
pa
rli
am
en
ts
Graph 1: Changes in the importance of political institutions for the representation 
of business interests (in percent)
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Consequently, there is ample evidence that most trade associations follow a double strategy in
representing their “European” interests. 69 % of all national trade associations participating in our
survey are in contact with European as well as national institutions; only 18 % of all national trade
associations still follow a mere national strategy. Even European trade associations have regular
contacts with both, European and national political institutions.2
This clearly shows that the European integration, which has brought about an increase in the
importance of EU institutions in the process of policy making, rendered the representation of interests
more complex, forcing interest representatives to act on several political levels simultaneously.
The different role and accessibility of political institutions
The different accessibility of the EU institutions
Political scientists as well as practical experts are well aware that different political institutions not only
play a different role in the European policy process, but that they also differ in their accessibility.
 The European Commission plays a decisive role in the European process of policy making due to
its exclusive right to initiate European legislation; at the same time the Commission promotes the
inclusion of affected interest groups into the process of policy formulation in order to draw upon
the expert knowledge of external actors.
 The Council, on the other hand, although probably still the most important European institution in
the policy-making process, is difficult to get in touch with due to its inter-governmental and inter-
national composition. Interest groups not only must try to convince their own national government
of the legitimacy and appropriateness of their demands, they also have to make sure that their
interests are supported by a sufficient number of states, either to form a veto-minority, or to ensure
a stable majority of EU-member states.
 The European Parliament, finally, still has less influence on the policy-making process than the
European Commission or the Council of Ministers, although it has gained importance through the
expanded application of the co-decision legislative procedure. However, the EP is very interested
in the communication with interest groups as this is a good opportunity to interact with the
electorate and to become a “spokesman” for the voters’ concerns, although this applies more to
NGOs than to business interests.
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 In the social sciences a return rate of 20 percent is considered to be sufficient; in our survey around 40 percent
of the questionnaires have been returned. See appendix 1.
2 62 % of the European trade associations participating in our survey do have contacts with national governments,
42 % with national parliaments and 41 % with national regulatory and standardisation authorities.
Arbei tspapiere  -  Mannheimer Zentrum fü r  Europäische Sozia l fo rschung  9
- 3 -
A closer look at the contacts with different political institutions and their relative importance confirms
these hypotheses.
 Generally, regular contacts with the working level of national governments or of the European
Commission (department managers; director-general) are more frequent than contacts with the
political level of government (Prime Minister/Bundeskanzler, ministers, national secretaries) or the
European Commission (Commissioners and cabinets).
 Similarly, contacts with individual members of a national parliament or the European Parliament
are more frequent than contacts with parliamentary parties or parliamentary committees.
 Finally, our data confirm that European institutions are easy to access and to receive information
from. An exception to this rule is the Council of Ministers: 14 % of all participants of the survey
consider it as difficult to obtain information from the Council and, as visible from graphs 2 to 4, the
data show a discrepancy between the high importance attributed to contacts with EU institutions
and the actual scope of these contacts, which again becomes especially visible in the case of the
Council of Ministers.
Graph 2: Contacts of business interests with the 
European Commission
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Graph 3: Contacts of business interests with 
the Council
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Graph 4: Contacts of business interests with the 
European Parliament
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The relevance of the budget
The general wisdom that “money makes the world go around” is also true for trade associations: those
which can fall back on high resources will find it easier to follow different tracks to represent their
interests than trade associations with a limited financial background and a smaller number of
personnel. This fact, however, does not tell us anything about their success of interest representation.
Indeed, the proportion of trade associations having monthly or weekly contacts with the different
European institutions is much higher within the group of trade associations with a high budget than
within the group of associations with a lower budget. Further, our data show that a trade association’s
work force is determined by its budget: the higher the budget, the larger the personnel employed by a
trade association. Trade associations with only few employees usually concentrate on the European
Commission and the national government as a lobbying addressee whereas trade associations with
more working staff also focus on the European Parliament and national parliaments as a target group.
Not surprisingly, the frequency of contacts with the European regulatory and standardisation
authorities does not correlate with the budget of a trade association, but with its assignments and
functions. Especially trade associations which are in charge of defining technical norms and
standards, but also trade associations involved in setting quality and educational standards often
make use of their communication channels to the European regulatory and standardisation authorities.
Graph 5: Percentage of trade associations, grouped by budget, having monthly 
or weekly contacts with EU institutions (budget in ECU)
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Advantages of big companies and European trade associations
 There are two reasons to expect big European companies and multinationals to gain access to
European political institutions without difficulty: (1) not only do they represent a considerable
power in terms of investment capacities and working places, which is difficult to ignore, but (2)
they also can - as single players - more easily adapt to the new European political environment
than can trade associations having different members whose divergent interests need to be tuned
before common action is possible.
 It is further assumed that European political institutions prefer to communicate with one single
interlocutor rather than with fifteen or more different interest representatives. Therefore, European
trade associations often aggregate and harmonise the various national or sectoral interests of their
members and hence find it easier to gain access to European political institutions than national
trade associations.
Our data confirm the expectation that it is easier for European trade associations and big companies
to get access to European institutions than it is for national trade associations. The data prove that the
share of European trade associations and big companies having very frequent contacts with European
institutions is much higher than the national trade associations’ share. This is particularly evident in the
case of the European Commission, but holds true for the other European institutions, too. Although
most trade associations do not consider it difficult to get information from European institutions,
European trade associations or big companies find this even easier than national trade associations.
G raph 6: Percentage of trade associations and com panies being 
m onthly or w eekly in  contact w ith  European institutions
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Opening a liaison office or branch in Brussels?
Interest groups extend their representation and organisation activities from the national level to the
European level by both the foundation of European trade associations and the establishment of liaison
offices or branches in Brussels. The development of the former is well known and coincides with the
different integration phases of the European Community, reaching its highest numbers in the years
1958-63, 1968-73 and 1988-93. The mushrooming of liaison offices or branches in Brussels by
national trade associations is a rather recent phenomenon, which has only become more common
since the Single European Act. Although only 23 % of all national trade associations participating in
our survey do have an office or branch in Brussels, quite a number of respondents intended to open a
branch in Belgium; therefore it can be expected that the number of liaison offices at the European
level will continue to rise.
And indeed, opening an office or branch in Brussels seems to be a useful investment. Our data imply
that the probability of having monthly or weekly contacts with the European Commission increases by
19 percentage points with the opening of an office or branch in Brussels, independent of a trade
associations’ financial resources.3 The latter, of course, may play an important role when setting up a
branch in Brussels is considered in the first instance.
In brief, our survey’s results concerning the accessibility of EU institutions are that whereas most trade
associations, independent of their budget, have contacts with the European Commission, contacts
with the Council are difficult to obtain, while contacts with the European Parliament seem to be of
second-rate importance. A liaison office in Brussels, however, may help to improve the interaction with
EU institutions.
                                                     
3 See appendix 2.
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The influence of national traditions on European lobbying
strategies
As advanced political scientists would expect, our data reveals that national traditions do matter. The
survey discloses some national peculiarities which can be explained by the differences in the national
political systems and by distinct traditions of policy making in Germany, Great Britain and France.
Access to national governments
Although around 80 % of all national trade associations have contacts with their national government
the data show that in France contacts of trade associations with the political level of government are
more regular than in Germany or Great Britain: whereas 47 % of the French trade associations do
have at least quarterly or even monthly or weekly contacts with the top level of the national
government, in Germany and in Great Britain this is true for only 29 % of the national trade
associations. 
This finding coincides with the picture of a more politicised public life and hence more politicised
lobbying strategies in France than in Germany or Great Britain, which is also underlined by the fact
that a significantly higher share of French trade associations consider the mobilisation of the public
and the media as a very useful strategy for European lobbying.
On the other hand, in all countries compared, regular contacts with the working level of the national
government are more numerous than contacts with the political level of the national government. Yet,
in Germany monthly or weekly contacts between national trade associations and the working level of
government are most frequent (FRG: 59 %; UK: 50 %; F: 43 %) which reflects the German
‘corporatist’ system and the important role of associations as intermediary organisations between the
state and the market.
The role of parliament
Another point proving the impact of national settings and traditions on the development of specific
European lobbying strategies is the role of the national parliament in the three political systems
compared. The role of the national parliament diverges significantly in Germany, Great Britain and
France.
 In Great Britain, where parliament is an important actor in the national policy process and where
Members of Parliament (MPs), due to the majority vote system, depend heavily on the support of
interest groups in their constituency, the percentage of trade associations having monthly or
weekly contacts with national MPs is much higher than in Germany or France (FRG: 22 %; UK:
32 %; F: 17 %).
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 In Germany, on the other hand, contacts with MPs are an important channel to represent interests
by providing useful expert knowledge to politicians, the Bundestag being a “working parliament”
with its members highly engaged in parliamentary working committees. Not surprisingly therefore
almost one out of two German trade associations which do have contacts with national parliament
committees consider these contacts to be very important. This is a significantly higher share than
in Great Britain or in France (FRG: 46 %; UK: 41 %; F: 31 %).
 In France, finally, the Assemblée Nationale and the Senat only have a limited influence on
legislation, the French government and the French president being the main political actors. Again
this low importance of the French national parliament is reflected by our data, which also reveals
how divergent contacts with the national parliament as a medium for interest representation are
assessed: whereas 56 % of the German trade associations and 48 % of the British trade
associations considered contacts with the national parliament as very useful, this is only the case
with 27 % of the French trade associations.
National regulatory and standardisation authorities
Contacts with national regulatory and standardisation authorities provide another example of national
differences. Once more, the differences can be attributed to distinct institutional settings. While in
Great Britain and France there exists a system of governmental control concerning the definition of
norms, in Germany technical standards and norms are not only laid down by trade associations, but
German trade associations also have committed themselves to control their members’ adherence to
the norms. As national regulatory and standardisation authorities therefore differ significantly in their
role, it comes as no surprise that in Germany contacts between trade associations and national
regulatory and standardisation authorities are less frequent than in the countries compared.
Table 1: Monthly or weekly contacts with regulatory and standardisation authorities (in
percent)
European
trade
associations
German trade
associations
British trade
associations
French trade
associations Companies
national regulatory and
standardisation
authorities
23,3 27,7 44,9 54,3 51,7
European regulatory
and standardisation
authorities
28,2 12,7 18,3 32,9 51,7
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Who is contacted, how and why?
Criteria for selecting a contact partner
Selecting a contact partner follows similar rules at national as well as at European level, with some
minor national differences. Administrative responsibility is the most often named criterion for the
selection of a contact partner, although personal relationship is another very important criterion for
choosing an interlocutor.
Table 2: Percentage of trade associations considering the following criteria as very important
for the selection of their contact partner
European
trade
associations
German trade
associations
British trade
associations
French trade
associations
EU-level
Administrative responsibility 77,0 87,5 56,7 82,4
Personal relationship 54,6 45,3 38,9 53,5
Language 12,6 22,0 36,2 33,3
Nationality 11,5 17,9 16,7 26,5
Party membership 8,7 3,7 5,9 6,8
National level
Administrative responsibility 70,3 90,6 65,5 83,1
Personal relationship 48,3 46,7 40,0 58,8
Regional origin 10,0 34,8 9,8 9,4
Party membership 6,5 7,4 5,2 15,0
Due to different “language teaching traditions” the share of those lobbyists considering language as an
important question when selecting a European contact partner is smaller in Germany than in Great
Britain or France.
The ideal contact person at the European level therefore is a personal acquaintance speaking the
same language as the lobbyist and holding important administrative responsibilities, his or her
nationality or party membership being of no importance. At national level, however, regional origin is a
further selection criteria in Germany’s federal system, while party membership proves to be of some
importance in France when looking for a person to turn to.
Useful lobbying instruments
The evaluation of different lobbying instruments reveals that most trade associations participating in
our survey consider personal contacts as the most important asset for the representation of their
interests in the European Union. 
Furthermore, not only the presence in committees and hearings, but also regular contacts and the
disposition of background information, as well as targeted contacts and information are considered as
Arbei tspapiere  -  Mannheimer Zentrum fü r  Europäische Sozia l fo rschung  9
- 10 -
very helpful instruments for interest representation by a majority of the survey participants. Position
papers and the presentation of scientific expertise are, however, assessed quite differently in the
different national groups, showing some parallels between French and European trade associations:
whereas more than three quarters of French and European trade associations responding to this
question consider position papers as very important, it is less than 58 % of the survey participants in
Germany and Great Britain.
Similarly, the presentation of scientific expertise is considered to be a very useful lobbying instrument
by around half of the European and French trade associations, while only a quarter of the German and
British trade associations consider this an effective lobbying tool.
The usefulness of transnational co-operation
Due to specific decision procedures in the European Union interest representatives are forced to co-
ordinate their activities with colleagues in different countries and on different levels. A comparison of
the usefulness assigned to the co-operation with different organisations indicates the important role of
EU trade associations for European interest intermediation. As the bi- or trilateral co-operation
between individual trade associations across borders requires a great deal of co-ordination, the
institutionalised co-operation within European trade associations turns out to be considered the most
useful way for business interests to synchronise their activities transnationally.
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Service provider or interest group?
A comparison of the tasks fulfilled by trade associations in Europe shows that their functions are quite
different. While differences in respect to market co-ordination are not that clear-cut, the role of trade
associations as service provider and interest representative vary considerably. Generally, it should be
kept in mind that in France most trade associations are also employers' associations whereas in Great
Britain and Germany as well as at EU level these two functions are usually not combined within a
single association.
Among the numerous tasks of trade associations related to market co-ordination, the definition of
technical standards and norms scores the highest: two thirds of all national and European trade
associations carry out this function. Similarly, around 45 % of all national and European trade
associations also co-ordinate research and development. Regulating the market entrance, however, is
more often part of a trade associations’ functions in France (36 %) and Germany (30 %), than in Great
Britain (18 %) or of trade associations on the European level (19 %).
As specific services are considered an important incentive for becoming a trade associations’
member, we also asked in our questionnaire what services trade associations offer. Most national and
European trade associations provide services like statistics and branch information or advertising and
public relations activities for their members. Market research, individual legal and economic
consulting, and access to consultancies, however, are much more often offered by French trade
associations than by German, British or European trade associations.
Graph 9: Percentage of trade associations and companies 
considering the cooperation with other organisations as very useful
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Yet, “external” interest representation proves to be the criterion distinguishing best between the
European, German, British and French trade associations. Whereas almost all national as well as
European trade associations participating in our survey represent their members’ interests vis-à-vis
other interest organisations, the “political” representation of their members’ interests is definitely not
part of the French political culture.
While monitoring political developments and informing their members about political developments, as
well as representing ones’ members’ interests in political committees and hearings are main functions
of at least three quarters of all European, German and British trade associations, only less than a half
of the French trade associations have this functions.
Comparing trade associations’ activities in the three respective countries, French trade associations
can rather be considered as service providers for their members, whereas German and British as well
as European trade associations put the main emphasis of their work on political information and
representation of their membership.
Active or reactive?
Benchmarking always involves the assessment of a competitors’ capacities as a “trend setter”. In the
sphere of interest intermediation, therefore, the most demanding but probably very promising strategy
is to influence the political agenda at the national or the European level right from the outset. Indeed,
up to fifty percent of the responding trade associations and companies indicated that they often
represent their interests as soon as the agenda is set. However, some qualifications on this finding
need to be made:
 Firstly, national trade associations as well as companies represent their interests more often vis-à-
vis national institutions than vis-à-vis European institutions when the political agenda is set, while
European trade associations are more active at European level.
 Secondly, French trade associations diverge significantly from the general picture: only
13 % of the French trade associations claimed to represent their interests at the agenda setting
stage vis-à-vis European institutions, while out of any other group at least a third (Great Britain), if
not a half of the interest representatives (Germany, companies) do so.4
Yet, trying to influence the agenda alone is not enough. Almost every handbook on lobbying strategies
underlines the importance to represent interests at every step of the policy cycle, starting from the
moment the agenda is set, continuing while the Commission formulates a proposal and while the
national position with regard to the Commissions’ proposal is formulated, but also during the debate in
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the EP and the Council. Likewise, so the recommendation, contacts should be maintained during the
transposition of EU law into national law and during the implementation by the national administration,
each step offering a new chance of successful interest representation.
Surprisingly, this is an advice only rarely followed. Generally, more trade associations and companies
represent their interests during the whole policy cycle vis-à-vis national institutions than vis-à-vis
European institutions. Yet, even in Germany, a country with a “corporatist culture”, only a third of the
trade associations participating in our survey claimed to be present at the national level at every phase
of the policy process.
Business interests, so the quintessence, mainly react to the political agenda focussing their resources
and man-power differently, depending on their individual possibilities and duties.
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 At the national level, the shares are a slightly higher, with 71 % of the German, 54 % of the British, 31 % of the
French, and 36 % of the European trade associations, and 65 % of the companies claiming to represent their
interests vis-à-vis national institutions at the agenda setting stage.
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Synopsis
The specific decision-making procedures in the European Union oblige interest representatives to co-
ordinate their activities with colleagues in different countries and at different organisational levels
within European (or international) trade associations.
However, our survey reveals that not only European trade associations and multinational companies,
but also national trade associations have direct contacts with European political institutions, even
though national trade associations still concentrate their activities during the European law-making
process on the national level, i.e. they are especially active
• when the national position with regard to the Commission proposal is formulated,
• when EU legislation is transposed into national law, and
• during the implementation by the national administration.
Influencing EU decisions via political institutions at the national as well as at the European level has
become an important part of European interest representation. Yet, the tools and paths chosen differ
significantly by country of origin owing to differences in the national political systems and traditions of
the EU member countries.
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Appendix
1. Rate of Returns of the Survey ”Intermediation of Interests in the European Union”
German trade
associations
British trade
associations
French trade
associations
EU trade
associations Companies Total
Questionnaires
returned 322 206 113 185 34 860
Trade
associations
addressed
727 501 350 420 68 2066
Rate of returns in
percent 44,3 % 41,1 % 32,3 % 44,0 % 50,0 % 41,6 %
2. Logistic Regression Model of Monthly or Weekly Contacts with the European Commission
Summary Statistics
Initial -2 Log Likelihood 615,88876
-2 Log Likelihood 514,883
Goodness of Fit 482,677
Cox & Snell - R^2       ,195
Coefficients *
Variable Coeff. Odds-ratio
Categories of trade associations
European
French -2,1138 ,1208
British -1,8006 ,1652
German -1,3437 ,2609
International -,5851 ,5570
Resources used for interest representation
less than 50 %
more than 50 % ,5831 1,7916
Number of members
less than 250
more than 251 -,0130 ,9870
Degree of organisation
less than 50 %
more than 50 % ,1367 1,1465
Budget
less than 500.000 ECU
more than 500.000 ECU ,4924 1,6362
Office or branch in Brussels
no
yes ,7687 2,1570
Constant -,1463
*As our questionnaire was sent to all trade associations in Germany, France, Great Britain, and at the European
level, this is not a random sample survey and tests of significance are not feasible.
